

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : Director of Logistics

DATE: 26 Feb 60

FROM : Chief, Administrative Staff

SUBJECT: Report of Headquarters Courier Systems

REFERENCE: Attached Study for Acting Director of Security from Chief, Physical Security Division, OS, dated 8 February 1960, same subject

1. A review has been made of reference study and the following comments are forwarded on specific recommendations or statements made in the study:

a. Page 2

"Recommendation: That an Office of Security survey be made of the Agency's procedures for classified document control to insure compliance with Executive Order 10501 and pertinent CIA Regulations."

This Staff concurs with the recommendation. It may be appropriate to point out that the Office of Security has never initiated procedures to be followed by the Mail and Courier Branch in handling classified material within the branch. Attachment G of the study was written by the branch without any assistance from the Office of Security.

b. Page 3

"Recommendation: That steps be taken to publish a manual for the preparation and transmission of classified mail. This manual would consolidate the remaining portions of CIA Regulation ☐ and include the over-all provisions of Executive Order 10501, setting forth examples and illustrations."

This Staff concurs with the recommendation. However, the statement made that the procedure of having other courier systems has resulted in using passengers and couriers of lower pay grades than the Mail and Courier Branch couriers is only a half truth. The complete reverse is true in the case of couriers assigned to OCI and PIO where the basic grade is GS-07.

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c. Page 3

"Recommendation: It is recommended that the Management Staff be requested to conduct a personnel study of the messenger-courier systems with a view towards reducing the duplicate courier systems."

Concur with this recommendation.

d. Page 4

"Recommendation: It is recommended that the Chief/OCF Liaison be requested to prepare a memorandum for all agencies and departments from whom classified material is picked up by CIA couriers. This memorandum should instruct these departments and agencies to verify the identity of all CIA couriers prior to turning over the classified material. In addition, all offices within the Central Intelligence Agency should be similarly instructed that their couriers show courier identification credentials (see attachment) when picking up classified material. The CIA couriers should also be instructed to report to the Office of Security any department or agency issuing classified material without verifying the identity of the courier."

Non-concur with this recommendation. Mail and Courier Branch personnel make deliveries and pick-ups from approximately one-hundred and forty (140) organizations and six-hundred (600) individuals. In our opinion, we could not expect everyone to follow a security regulation or procedure dictated by CIA. Further, acting in the capacity of a spy on other Agencies' personnel could only create hard feelings.

e. Page 4

"Recommendation: It is recommended that a memorandum be disseminated throughout the Agency instructing all couriers to (a) effect delivery only to the person addressed or an authorized named representative; (b) that all couriers be required to request identification from all individual recipients prior to the delivery of classified material; and (c) under no conditions should classified material be delivered to unauthorized persons. If the above cannot be complied with, the material should be returned for a later delivery or contact be made via telephone for additional instructions."

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Non-concur with this recommendation. Again, since we deliver to six-hundred (600) individuals, this recommendation is considered impractical. There would have to be a minimum of twelve-hundred (1200) personnel who would have to receive instructions on identification of CIA couriers. Further, components of the Department of Defense require that all mail go through a central registry. In addition, we question the propriety of attempting to dictate security policy to offices such as that of the Vice President.

f. Page 5

"Recommendation: That all couriers be required to keep individual trip logs or manifests which would reflect the times of arrivals and departures at all facilities visited, and automobile mileage, such records to be turned in on a daily basis to the immediate supervisor. The supervisor will be required to examine these records for accuracy and take necessary action where discrepancies are noted. This log or manifest is not intended to be the only means of checking on courier personnel, but be considered as additional control measure."

Concur with this recommendation. The branch will attempt to design a log sheet.

g. Page 5

"Recommendation: It is recommended that where escorts are not provided for, all vehicles be [redacted] while in transit."

Concur with the recommendation on long trips such as to Atomic Energy Commission. However, on short trips it is felt that the time wasted would outweigh the security advantages.

h. Page 9

"Recommendation: While the Mail and Courier Branch/OI personnel exercise every effort to prevent the improper transmission of classified material, it is felt that positive action should be undertaken to correct this security deficiency. Realizing that due to T/O limitations that have been placed upon the Mail and Courier Branch, it is

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difficult at this time to make a specific corrective recommendation. It is recommended that appropriate personnel within the Office of Logistics, Office of Personnel, and the Office of Security meet and consider methods of resolving this problem."

Concur with this recommendation as long as it is understood that the responsibility lies with the originators.

1. Page 9

"Recommendation: When large bulk shipments of classified material are delivered to other agencies, the Mail and Courier Branch courier wait until the recipient has inventoried the contents and the manifest type of receipt signed by the recipient."

Non-concur with this recommendation for two reasons. First, the courier does not have time for the mail bag to be opened and the contents checked; and second, there appears to be no difference between a bag containing several packages and an envelope containing several individual papers. In each case, the addressee is not sure of the contents until the bag or envelope is opened.

2. Page 11 of the study states that OCI couriers have been specially selected for this position due to their loyalty and trustworthiness. If this is meant to imply that other couriers are a so-called inferior group, then the statement is not true. The Mail and Courier Branch provided the original assignees, provides couriers for overtime work, and has been called upon to send substitutes to OCI and there has never been any question as to the loyalty and trustworthiness of any of these personnel.

3. The statement is made that the Office of Security gives firearms instructions to the couriers. If teaching a man which end of the gun the bullet comes out of is considered complete instruction, then the statement is true. However, to our knowledge no instructions have been given on when to use a firearm which should be a basic part of the course. } Good Point

4. The question of whether all messengers and couriers should be assigned to the Mail and Courier Branch or whether certain ones should be assigned to the using components, is one which requires detailed investigation and study. If it is determined that the

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latter is more efficient, then in our opinion, the using component should be responsible for their slotting and should include them in their budget.

5. In summary, if the recommendations of the Office of Security were accepted, we would require an increase in the courier force. There appears to be no way for us to maintain our present efficiency without an increase in the courier staff if the administrative workload is increased.



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Attachments:

1. Ref, w/as
2. Memo from Acting D/S to
Acting DD/S dtd 5 Feb
1960

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

- 1 - OL Official File, w/as
- 1 - OL/AS/MECF, w/as

- destroy d

OL/AS  (26 Feb 1960)

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